Carbon Mitigation Initiative
CMI

CMI Integration and Outreach

CMI Integration and Outreach

CMI Integration and Outreach introduces new conceptual frameworks that are useful for climate change policy. One effort seeks to make the emerging statistical analyses of extreme events more accessible. A second effort focuses on improving the risk-assessment framework for the current scientific understanding of sea level rise. A third explores the value for climate policy analysis of adding a new component to traditional carbon accounting that tracks “committed emissions,” i.e., the future emissions that are likely to result when a power plant, vehicle, or addition to infrastructure is placed into service.

Research Highlights – At a Glance

Robert Williams, Eric Larson, and Thomas Kreutz: Meeting current targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate climate change will require major changes in the makeup of the US electricity sector in the coming decades. A study by the Energy Systems Analysis group identifies incentives for carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a promising and economically viable approach to meeting emissions reduction goals. The study includes a thought experiment that analyzes how the contributions of different CCS technologies, along with shifts to renewable energy sources, could enable the US to achieve an 83% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from power generation by 2050.

Michael Oppenheimer: To achieve incremental, near-term greenhouse gas emissions reductions, both governmental and private stakeholders can be encouraged to form partnerships driven by diverse political and economic incentives. These initiatives may take a variety of forms, and may serve to enhance the emissions reductions promised by existing international agreements.

Robert Socolow: A new academic field, Destiny Studies, should be created to foster coherent thinking about future time and the planetary vulnerabilities that will constrain what we are able to do. Today, when we make decisions that affect future generations, we are inconsistent and not guided by general principles. Notably, we are confused about future time—for example, we have difficulty distinguishing 500-year and 50-year time frames. Climate change and its solutions make particularly stringent demands on thinking about the future and are ripe for Destiny Studies.


Toward a Low-Carbon Future for US Electricity
Principal Investigators: Robert Williams, Eric Larson, and Thomas Kreutz

At a Glance

Meeting current targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate climate change will require major changes in the makeup of the US electricity sector in the coming decades. A study by the Energy Systems Analysis group identifies incentives for carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a promising and economically viable approach to meeting emissions reduction goals. The study includes a thought experiment that analyzes how the contributions of different CCS technologies, along with shifts to renewable energy sources, could enable the US to achieve an 83% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from power generation by 2050.

Research Highlight

One ongoing activity launched in 2015 by the Energy Systems Analysis Group involves exploring strategies for getting the carbon capture part of the faltering global carbon capture and storage (CCS) enterprise back on track, and the potential role of CCS in a low-carbon future for US electricity.1 The CCS focus stems from the prospect that without CCS, achieving a low-carbon global energy future is likely to be much more costly and perhaps impossible,2 and the growing popular belief that CCS is too costly to become a major carbon-mitigation option.3

CCS progress has been slow partly because first-of-a-kind project costs have been higher than expected. Many projects were canceled because government incentives were inadequate to enable them to go forward. In the US, the shale gas revolution has stymied CCS market launch. But CCS costs are likely to be reduced through experience (learning by doing). Incentives are needed to realize cost reductions, and are economically justified4 if there are good prospects for cost reduction through technology cost buydown.

The proposed CCS initiative involves expanded federal research, development, and demonstration on advanced carbon dioxide (CO2) capture concepts, the phased introduction of a greenhouse gas emissions price sufficient to ensure that all fossil-fuel based power plants built after 2030 will have CCS, and—the centerpiece—a national Low Carbon Electricity Portfolio Standard (LCEPS). The initiative is a variant of the successful worldwide approach for advancing renewables via technologypush (support for research, development, and demonstration) and market-pull (feed-in tariffs, tax credits, and renewable portfolio standards). Cost reductions and growth have been especially dramatic recently for photovoltaic technology.5

The LCEPS would mandate low-carbon electricity as a growing fraction of electricity from 2021 to 2050. Wind, solar, hydro, nuclear, and CCS technology providers would compete to provide this lowcarbon electricity. The Standard would also offer technology cost buydown incentives for options offering good prospects for cost reductions via learning by doing.

Current nuclear technologies would not qualify for early technology cost buydown incentives because historically nuclear technologies have had negative learning rates,6 but advanced concepts with good prospects for cost-cutting (e.g., factory-manufactured modular reactors) might qualify later. For wind and solar, which have good prospects for continuing cost reduction,7 incentives might be continued as current tax credits. Incentives for promising CO2 capture options would be determined by a market mechanism such as a reverse auction.8

The extent to which CCS costs can be reduced via experience is not known, because there has been no significant CCS experience. However, commercial experience with related technologies suggests that cost reductions through experience are plausible, especially if government requires, as a condition for receiving subsidies, information-sharing on cost-reduction opportunities among successive projects. Moreover, the study shows that for the approach chosen for carrying out technology cost buydown, with captured CO2 sold for enhanced oil recovery, the US government can afford to find out, by supporting a few projects, the actual learning rates for promising CO2 capture technologies. This is because, if the technology cost buydown process takes place when crude oil prices are $75 per barrel or higher,9 the gross new federal corporate income tax revenues from subsidized projects (arising from new domestic production of liquid fuels displacing imported oil) would typically be greater than required subsidies—an outcome first recognized by the National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative.10

The study found that, of the five near-term CCS options considered, two offer good prospects for becoming competitive after 2030 as new power plants if earlier demonstration and technology cost buydown activities are successful: NGCC-CCS, a natural gas combined cycle; and CBTLE-CCS, a system coproducing synthetic liquid fuels and electricity (30% of output) from coal and biomass with enough biomass (34%) to realize zero net greenhouse gas emissions,11 based on earlier research.12

The study explored, via a thought experiment, whether these CCS technologies, plus wind and solar, might provide the basis for a plausible low-carbon future for US electricity. The thought experiment was constructed to realize an 83% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions for US power generation by 2050.13 Key assumptions include:

  1. Existing coal-generating capacity is retired from 2031 to 2050 at a constant rate of 13 GWe per year, leading to retirement of all coal plants by 2050.
  2. Concomitant CBTLE-CCS and NGCC-CCS deployment, such that coal input capacity remains constant at the 2030 level and enough NGCC-CCS capacity is deployed to match electricity generation at the rate for retired coal plants.
  3. The remaining power not met in 2050 by nuclear, hydro, or geothermal power is provided by a mix of NGCC and intermittent renewables (wind and solar), assuming that three-quarters of total NGCC power is in plants with CCS—which implies widespread adoption of CCS retrofits. The implicit deployment rates14 are sufficiently modest that they are plausibly feasible with the assumed policy incentives.

Under these assumptions, the US electricity generation mix in 2050 (see Figure 3.1) includes NGCC (37%), CBTLE-CCS (23%), wind and solar (16%), nuclear (16%), conventional hydro (6%), and geothermal power (2%)—a diversified electricity supply portfolio,15 for which 69% is baseload electricity—slightly less than the 72% average for baseload power from 1998 to 2014. Although the CBTLE-CCS power share in 2050 is less than coal’s 39% share in 2014, CBTLE-CCS also provides 5.2 million barrels per day of zero-emissions transportation fuels in 2050, so that coal use via CBTLE-CCS in 2050 is slightly more than coal use for power in 2005. Moreover, CBTLE-CCS is a promising way whereby reduced oil import dependence16 and carbon mitigation goals might be pursued simultaneously.

The 2.5 gigatons per year of CO2 storage rate for the US in 2050 implies the necessity of a partnership between the power industry and the oil and gas industries that would manage CO2 storage. The 625 million tons per year of biomass then required can plausibly be provided by agricultural and forest residues not currently being used17 and by growing biomass on abandoned cropland18 (thereby avoiding food/fuel conflicts). The biomass required is modest because: (a) CBTLE-CCS requires only about 40% as much biomass energy per gigajoule of liquid transportation fuel output as a conventional cellulosic biofuel such as cellulosic ethanol, and (b) attractive CBTLE-CCS economics based on costly marginal biomass supplies can be realized under a strong carbon mitigation policy.19

The proposed CO2 capture or similar public policy initiative is needed to facilitate realization of the envisioned or similar 2050 outcome, because historically major energy system transformations have required 80 to 130 years20—far longer than the time during which climate scientists say evolution to a low-emissions energy future must take place to keep major climate change damages to tolerable levels.

Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1. Thought experiment for US electricity to 2050. Numbers at bar tops are greenhouse gas emissions relative to 2005. The thought experiment is constructed as a variant of the Reference Scenario for 2040 of Annual Energy Outlook 2015.21 The 2005 and 2014 bars represent historical data. The 2030 bar represents the Reference Scenario projection adjusted to allow for early deployment of 22 capture plants storing CO2 via enhanced oil recovery during the technology cost buydown process. The 2050 bar represents the thought experiment as described in the text. The following are additional assumptions for the thought experiment:
- Total generation and generation by each of nuclear, hydro, and geothermal supplies in 2050 are extrapolations of 2040 values from the Reference Scenario, assuming average Reference Scenario growth rates for 2035 to 2040.
- Biomass use for power generation in 2050 other than via CBTLE-CCS is zero.
- Oil use for power generation in 2050 is zero.

References

  1. Williams, R.H., 2016. Exploiting Near-Term BECCS to Facilitate a Low-Carbon Future for US Electricity. Manuscript in preparation, March, 2016.
  2. Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J. C. Minx (eds.). Technical Summary. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
  3. Biello, D., 2016. The Carbon Capture Fallacy. Sci. Am., 314(1): 59-65.
  4. Duke. R.D., 2002. Clean Energy Technology Buydowns: Economic Theory, Analytic Tools, and the Photovoltaic Case. Ph.D. Dissertation, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
  5. Unsubsidized photovoltaic module costs fell twelve-fold from 2000 to 2014. Falling costs have led to rapid deployment. In the US, photovoltaic generating capacity additions from 2011 to 2014 totaled 16.3 GWe, 1.4 times the capacity added for the natural gas combined cycle, the fossil fuel technology of choice for new US power in this period.
  6. Grubler, A., 2010. The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: a case of negative learning by doing. Energy Policy, 38(9): 5174-5188. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.05.003.
  7. BP p.l.c., November 2015. BP Technology Outlook. London, UK.
  8. Phillips, B., 2010. Using Reverse Auctions in a Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) Deployment Program. Boston: Clean Air Task Force.
  9. Plausibly the total cost of producing an additional barrel of US crude oil post-2025 with growing developing world oil demand.
  10. National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative, 2012. Carbon Dioxide Enhanced Oil Recovery: A Critical Domestic Energy, Economic, and Environmental Opportunity.
  11. CBTLE-CCS would also be characterized by ultra-low emissions of SO2, NOx, PM2.5, and Hg.
  12. Liu, G., E.D. Larson, R.H. Williams, T.G. Kreutz, and X. Guo, 2011. Making Fischer-Tropsch fuels and electricity from coal and biomass: performance and cost analysis. Energy and Fuels, 25(1): 415- 437. doi:10.1021/ef101184e.
  13. Consistent with the Administration’s goal of reducing overall greenhouse gas emissions for the US energy economy by 83% by 2050.
  14. 7.8 GWe/year and 2.0 GWe/year for CBTLE-CCS and NGCC-CCS, respectively.
  15. Power companies and their regulators often worry about electricity supply diversity loss that would arise if the power system were to become “overly dependent” on natural gas.
  16. For comparison, US net oil imports were 5.1 million barrels per day in 2014.
  17. US Department of Energy, 2011. US Billion-Ton Update: Biomass Supply for a Bioenergy and Bioproducts Industry. R.D. Perlack and B.J. Stokes (Leads), ORNL/TM-2011/224. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
  18. Zumkehr, A., and J.E. Campbell, 2013. Historical US cropland areas and the potential for bioenergy production on abandoned croplands. Environ. Sci. Technol., 47(8): 3840-3847. doi:10.1021/es3033132.
  19. Larson, E.D., G. Fiorese, G. Liu, R.H. Williams, T.G. Kreutz, and S. Consonni, 2010. Co-production of decarbonized synfuels and electricity from coal + biomass with CO2 capture and storage: an Illinois case study. Energy Environ. Sci., 3: 28-42. doi:10.1039/B911529C.
  20. Grubler, A., 2014. Grand designs: Historical patterns and future scenarios of energy technological change. In Energy Technology Innovation: Learning from Historical Successes and Failures. Eds. A. Grubler and C. Wilson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 39-53.
  21. US Energy Information Administration, 2015. Annual Energy Outlook 2015. Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration.

Fostering New Collaborations to Curb Climate Change
Principal Investigator: Michael Oppenheimer

At a Glance

To achieve incremental, near-term greenhouse gas emissions reductions, both governmental and private stakeholders can be encouraged to form partnerships driven by diverse political and economic incentives. These initiatives may take a variety of forms, and may serve to enhance the emissions reductions promised by existing international agreements.

Research Highlight

Since its initial adoption in 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has made progress in strengthening the commitments of national governments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a notable agreement on Nationally Determined Contributions reached in late 2015. While these pledges are significant, they are not legally binding and are unlikely to be sufficient to meet the goal of a peak and subsequent decline in global emissions in the near future.

To complement the efforts of the UNFCCC, Oppenheimer and his colleagues have proposed a framework involving a variety of initiatives that engage both public and private actors, taking advantage of stakeholders’ diverse motivations, which are not necessarily directly related to mitigating climate change. This “building blocks” approach holds the potential to spur emissions reductions in an incremental, low-risk fashion. The researchers suggest that the UNFCCC may play a key role in encouraging, developing, and improving such initiatives.1

Oppenheimer, together with New York University environmental law specialists Richard Stewart and Bryce Rudyk, has evaluated alternative paradigms for building strategies to leverage diverse motivations for emissions reductions. These include:

  1. Clubs of private or public entities whose members agree to follow a set of rules. Members may have different incentives for following the rules. One example of such a club is the International Smart Grid Action Network, an association of 24 national governments and the European Commission that collaborates on the development and adoption of clean energy technologies. In the private sector, another potential model is that of the Forest Stewardship Council, a group of businesses and environmental NGOs that has established a certification system to set industry standards and respond to consumer demand for sustainable products.
  2. Linkages that extend the missions of existing international agreements and organizations. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, for instance, has been adjusted six times since it was adopted in 1987. As further information becomes available, new ozonedepleting chemicals have been added to the Protocol, and the group is considering the addition of substitutes for these chemicals that are also greenhouse gases. Oppenheimer, Stewart, and Rudyk suggest that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations might expand its Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, which obligates countries to limit pollution from land and forest fires, to include provisions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
  3. Dominant actors that take measures prompting others to follow similar rules. The impacts of this model are evident from the so-called “California effect,” which has encouraged other jurisdictions to adopt more stringent motor vehicle emissions laws, and the “Brussels effect,” in which European Union consumer product regulations have led to stricter standards in the global marketplace.

Stimulating the spread and impact of such strategies will require increased and sustained support for enterprising individuals within the relevant institutions. Oppenheimer and his colleagues suggest that the UNFCCC may serve as a key champion for spurring and developing effective partnerships.

They conclude that the UNFCCC has the potential to provide vital information, organize stakeholders, contribute technical and financial resources, and raise the visibility of emerging efforts. These activities may be coordinated through the UNFCCC’s Technical Expert Meetings and other events held in conjunction with each Conference of the Parties, while the UNFCCC’s Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) may serve as a clearinghouse to monitor emissions reductions resulting from cooperative programs.

Figure 3.2
Figure 3.2. Display of flags at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21) in Paris. (Wikimedia, Surfnico)

References

  1. Stewart, R.B., M. Oppenheimer, and B. Rudyk, 2015. A building blocks strategy for global climate change. In Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime. Eds. S. Barrett, C. Carraro, and J. de Melo. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research Press, 213-223.

Destiny Studies: Creating Our Near and Far Futures
Principal Investigator: Robert Socolow

At a Glance

A new academic field, Destiny Studies, should be created to foster coherent thinking about future time and the planetary vulnerabilities that will constrain what we are able to do. Today, when we make decisions that affect future generations, we are inconsistent and not guided by general principles. Notably, we are confused about future time—for example, we have difficulty distinguishing 500-year and 50-year time frames. Climate change and its solutions make particularly stringent demands on thinking about the future and are ripe for Destiny Studies.

Research Highlight

Many of us spend a lot of time thinking about the future well beyond our lifetimes. Yet when we make decisions that affect future generations, we are inconsistent and not guided by general principles. Notably, we are confused about future time. We find it hard to separate the far future (say 500 years from now) from 50 years from now. Five hundred years ahead, we have almost no idea what people will be like, but we are pretty sure that people’s needs and capabilities in 50 years will resemble ours. A new academic field could help us think coherently about future time and the planetary vulnerabilities that will constrain what we are able to do. This discipline might be called Destiny Studies.

Sea level rise is a particularly dramatic example of the challenge of coping with future time. Sea level rose 120 meters to its current level as Earth emerged from the last ice age, and it then was uncharacteristically constant over the past 5,000 years. Now sea level rise is resuming. A complete melting of the Greenland ice sheet would yield seven meters of sea level rise, and a similar rise is at stake from the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.

For the sake of argument, suppose we knew that ahead there would be one meter of sea level rise per century, continuing for many centuries. The impact of one, two, four, and eight meters of sea level rise on Florida and the Gulf Coast is seen in Figure 3.3.1. For such a future, the corresponding dates would be 2100, 2200, 2400, and 2800, respectively. Destiny Studies asks: How much do we care, and should we care, about a southern Florida that is underwater in the year 2500? Does it matter that our descendants 500 years from now might be far more or far less prepared to deal with sea level rise—or much like us? Does it matter that we cannot know how they will perceive their obligations to generations that are in their future?

Long-term storage of waste is another subject in need of Destiny Studies. In a quest for ethically responsible nuclear waste disposal, policymakers soon after World War II sought to establish an operative time frame. They drew on the half-lives of isotopes—notably, the half-life of plutonium 239, which is 24,100 years. The standards that emerged, in essence, invoke a human being living close to a disposal site 24,100 years from now, farming and eating and drinking much as today, who is to be protected from getting cancer from leaking radiation. There are very few other domains where present actions are circumscribed by obligations of such durability. With hindsight, hubris was at work. For every proposed disposal site, a red team seems always able to come up with leakage mechanisms that the blue team can’t reject, when the time frame for near-perfect storage is many millennia.

Figure 3.3.1
Figure 3.3.1. Changes in the southeast US coastline with sea level rise. Source: T. Knutson, Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, NOAA.

Public opinion is unlikely to allow a rollback of nuclear waste management standards. However, it is not too late to avoid excessive stringency in new areas. An important example is the emerging standards for the leakage of stored carbon dioxide (CO2) associated with CO2 capture and storage (CCS). Right now, the dominant view seems to be that the rate of leakage from these reservoirs must be fixed now so as to assure that if someday enormous volumes of CO2 are stored, leakage will create negligible climate change. Rules so demanding may well lead to another stalemate. As with nuclear waste, the concepts of iteration with experience and progressive tightening are missing from the discourse.

Unburnable carbon is a third vexatious problem in need of help from Destiny Studies. Not long ago “Peak Oil” was promoted by academics, who asserted that nearly half of the world’s conventional oil had already been produced and that a slow, steady decline in production inevitably lay ahead. A public hungry for reassuring news about climate change inferred that the end was near for all fossil fuel, and that the world would be rescued from climate change by physical depletion. The recent commercialization of shale gas and shale oil has largely brought this wishful thinking to a close, as it becomes more widely understood that commercially attractive fossil fuels are abundant, rather than scarce. To address climate change, successive generations of human beings will need to leave most of these hydrocarbons underground.

Hans-Holger Rogner estimates that 80,000 billion tons of CO2 would be created by burning all of the world’s oil, natural gas, and coal resources, both conventional and unconventional—an amount equal to 2,000 years of emissions at today’s rate and also more than 25 times larger than the 3,000 billion tons of CO2 in the atmosphere right now.1 Methane hydrates, also known as “clathrates” (ice crystals with methane molecules in their interstices), account for more than half of Rogner’s estimate. Clathrates can exist within only narrow ranges of temperatures and pressures, but such ranges are found in the Arctic onshore beneath the permafrost and on the boundaries of continents just below the sea floor. Pilot projects to extract clathrates are already underway in Japan and India.

The carbon budget measures the total quantity of carbon in fossil fuel that will be extracted, ever. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports connect the carbon budget to the rise in the ultimate rise in the Earth’s average surface temperature. They find an approximately linear relationship and associate each 1,600 billion tons of CO2 emissions with each Celsius degree of warming, out to 3oC. The 1,600 billion tons of CO2 already emitted will bring one degree of warming, and budgets of 3,200 and 4,800 billion tons of CO2 of total emissions (past and future) will bring two and three degrees of warming, respectively. The two panels in Figure 3.3.2 show examples of these budgets. The future emissions of the two-degree trajectory are 2% of Rogner’s 80,000 billion tons of CO2; for three-degrees, these emissions are 4%.

The emissions scenario in Panel A —which depicts cutting global CO2 emissions in half in 40 years— is representative of what is required to meet the demanding two-degree target promoted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris last December. The extra four decades in Panel B relative to Panel A produce an additional whole degree of surface temperature rise in exchange for a calmer transition out of fossil fuels. Even the Panel B trajectory, however, affects exploration for new fossil fuels, because the strategic decisions by governments and companies, such as whether to develop resources in the Arctic—and whether to develop clathrates—entail commitments to emissions many decades from now.

Some of the questions implicit in carbon budgets are profound and nasty: From which countries should fuels be extracted and in which countries should they be consumed? When? For what purposes? In each case, who judges? Over the next 50 years, constraining “unburnable” fossil fuel will occupy center-stage.

Our endowment of plentiful fossil fuel is just one of a class of temptations that could lead human beings to burst our planet’s seams by producing and consuming too much of a good thing. More kids, more meat, more leisure travel—all are problematic. Problems of abundance will be grist for the mill of Destiny Studies.

Figure 3.3.2
Figure 3.3.2. Representative CO2 emissions trajectories consistent with two-degree and three-degree temperature targets. The dark triangles are an adequate abstraction of emissions to date. Panel A models the two-degree rise; it has no plateau at all and it mimics Peak Oil—we’re halfway done. Panel B (“three degrees”) adds a brief, 40-year plateau at today’s emissions rate.

Iteration is a likely theme of Destiny Studies. How scared human beings will become of climate change will depend on what the Earth tells us about itself, decade by decade. Right now, the best and the worst outcomes 50 years from now that are consistent with climate science are very different. Gradually, during the coming 50 years, the Earth will give us clues about its variability and its feedback loops, such as those involving clouds, ice, and forests—provided that climate science flourishes. How can iteration be built into human institutions that govern future behavior so that new knowledge is taken into account?

Our collective afterlife is yet another problem suited for Destiny Studies. Sam Scheffler, a professor of philosophy at New York University and the author of Death and the Afterlife, asks how important it is for humanity to continue and answers that it is very important. He observes that human life derives much of its meaning from being embedded in a “thriving ongoing exercise,” and that “humanity itself as an ongoing project provides the implicit frame of reference for most of our judgments about what matters.” Our connectedness to future generations “staves off nihilism.” We do not want to live forever; but we want the human project of which we are a part to endure.2 Scheffler’s book plowed new ground in philosophy—evidence that Destiny Studies is a project that has hardly begun.

References

  1. Rogner, H.-H., F. Barthel, M. Cabrera, A. Faaij, M. Giroux, D. Hall, V. Kagramanian, S. Kononov, T. Lefevre, R. Moreira, R. Nötstaller, P. Odell, and M. Taylor, 2000. In World Energy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability, United Nations Development Programme, New York, 149.
  2. Scheffler, S., 2013. Death and the Afterlife. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 59-69.

Integration and Outreach Publications

Dennig, F., M.B. Budolfson, M. Fleurbaey, A. Siebert, and R.H. Socolow, 2015. Inequality, climate impacts on the future poor, and carbon prices. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 112(52): 15827-15832. doi:10.1073/ pnas.1513967112.

Hannam, P.M., Z. Liao, S.J. Davis, and M. Oppenheimer, 2015. Developing country finance in a post-2020 global climate agreement. Nat. Clim. Chang., 5(11): 983- 987. doi:10.1038/nclimate2731.

Liu, G., E.D. Larson, R.H. Williams, and X. Guo, 2015. Gasoline from coal and/or biomass with CO2 capture and storage, 1. Process designs and performance analysis. Energy and Fuels, 29(3): 1830-1844. doi:10.1021/ef502667d.

Liu, G., E.D. Larson, R.H. Williams, and X. Guo, 2015. Gasoline from coal and/or biomass with CO2 capture and storage, 2. Economic analysis and strategic context. Energy and Fuels, 29(3): 1845-1859. doi:10.1021 /ef502668n.

Socolow, R.H., 2015. Climate change and Destiny Studies: Creating our near and far futures. B. Atom. Sci., 71(6): 18-28. doi:10.1177/0096340215611080.

Stewart, R.B., M. Oppenheimer, and B. Rudyk, 2015. A building blocks strategy for global climate change. In Towards a Workable and Effective Climate Regime. Eds. S. Barrett, C. Carraro, and J. de Melo. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research Press, 213-223.


Acknowledgments

Principal funding support for the Carbon Mitigation Initiative has been provided by BP International Limited.

Carbon Mitigation Initiative Leadership and Administration
Stephen W. Pacala, co-director
Robert H. Socolow, co-director

Rajeshri D. Chokshi, technical support specialist
Stacey T. Christian, business administration
Kristina Corvin, administrative assistant
Caitlin Daley, administrative assistant
Katharine B. Hackett, associate director, Princeton Environmental Institute
Axel Haenssen, technical support specialist
Igor Heifetz, webmaster
Molly Sharlach, editorial consultant
Shavonne L. Malone, former administrative assistant
Holly P. Welles, manager, communications and outreach

Contributing Editors
Molly Sharlach
Holly P. Welles

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