Bibliography - M. Tavoni

1. Tavoni, M., Shoibal Chakravarty, and Robert H. Socolow, 2012: Safe vs. Fair: A Formidable Trade-off in Tackling Climate Change. Sustainability, Basel, Switzerland, MDPI Publishing, 4(2), doi:10.3390/su4020210 210-226
   [ Abstract ]

   Global warming requires a response characterized by forward-looking management of atmospheric carbon and respect for ethical principles. Both safety and fairness must be pursued, and there are severe trade-offs as these are intertwined by the limited headroom for additional atmospheric CO₂ emissions. This paper provides a simple numerical mapping at the aggregated level of developed vs. developing countries in which safety and fairness are formulated in terms of cumulative emissions and cumulative per capita emissions respectively. It becomes evident that safety and fairness cannot be achieved simultaneously for strict definitions of both. The paper further posits potential global trading in future cumulative emissions budgets in a world where financial transactions compensate for physical emissions: the safe vs. fair tradeoff is less severe but remains formidable. Finally, we explore very large deployment of engineered carbon sinks and show that roughly 1,000 Gt CO₂ of cumulative negative emissions over the century are required to have a significant effect, a remarkable scale of deployment. We also identify the unexplored issue of how such sinks might be treated in sub-global carbon accounting.

2. Tavoni, M., and R.S.J. Tol, 2010: Counting only the hits? The risk of underestimating the costs of a stringent climate policy. Climatic Change, doi:10.1007/s10584-010-9867-9
   [ Abstract ]

   This paper warns against the risk of underestimating the costs—and the uncertainty about the costs—of achieving stringent stabilization targets. We argue that a straightforward review of integrated assessment models results produces biased estimates for the more ambitious climate objectives such as those compatible with the 2°C of the European Union and the G8. The magnitude and range of estimates are significantly reduced because only the most optimistic results are reported for such targets. We suggest a procedure that addresses this partiality. The results show highly variable costs for the most ambitious scenarios.

3. Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, and M. Tavoni, November 2009: A Chinese Commitment to Commit: Can it Break the Negotiation Stall? Climatic Change, Netherlands, Springer, 97(No. 1-2), doi:10.1007/s10584-009-9726-8 297-303
   [ Abstract PDF ]

   Preparatory talks to the next round of negotiations seem to indicate that a comprehensive agreement to mitigate climate change will not be easily attainable, despite the intentions of the US administration and the high expectations surrounding the Copenhagen meeting. One key reason is to what extent fast growing economies, and especially China, should take actions to reduce their growth of emissions. This paper argues that a turning point for international negotiations on climate change could be achieved if China were to agree on carbon obligations in the future. Results from modelling work suggest that the optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years, and that thus future commitments—if credible—could lead to significantly earlier steps towards carbon mitigation. If fast growing economies, and foremost China, believe in the long term objective of global stabilization of carbon concentrations, it might be economically rationale to sign on future targets, provided developed countries take on immediate action. Such a provision could be beneficial for both the developing and developed world.

4. Chakravarty, Shoibal, A. Chikkatur, H. de Coninck, Stephen W. Pacala, Robert H. Socolow, and M. Tavoni, 2009: Sharing global CO₂ emission reductions among one billion high emitters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106(29), doi:10.1073/pnas.0905232106 11884-11888
   [ Abstract ]

   We present a framework for allocating a global carbon reduction target among nations, in which the concept of ‘‘common but differentiated responsibilities’’ refers to the emissions of individuals instead of nations. We use the income distribution of a country to estimate how its fossil fuel CO₂ emissions are distributed among its citizens, from which we build up a global CO₂ distribution. We then propose a simple rule to derive a universal cap on global individual emissions and find corresponding limits on national aggregate emissions from this cap. All of the world’s high CO₂ emitting individuals are treated the same, regardless of where they live. Any future global emission goal (target and time frame) can be converted into national reduction targets, which are determined by ‘‘Business as Usual’’ projections of national carbon emissions and incountry income distributions. For example, reducing projected global emissions in 2030 by 13 GtCO₂ would require the engagement of 1.13 billion high emitters, roughly equally distributed in 4 regions: the U.S., the OECD minus the U.S., China, and the nonOECD minus China. We also modify our methodology to place a floor on emissions of the world’s lowest CO₂ emitters and demonstrate that climate mitigation and alleviation of extreme poverty are largely decoupled.

5. Chakravarty, Shoibal, Robert H. Socolow, and M. Tavoni, November 2009: A Focus on Individuals Can Guide Nations Towards a Low Carbon World. Climate Science and Policy, http://www.climatescienceandpolicy.eu/2009/11/a-focus-on-individuals-can-guide-nations-towards-a-low-carbon-world/, Nov. 13, 2009,
   [ PDF ]
6. Chakravarty, Shoibal, A. Chikkatur, H. de Coninck, Stephen W. Pacala, M. Tavoni, and Robert H. Socolow, 2009: Reply to Grubler and Pachauri: Developing national obligations from individual emissions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106(43 E124), doi:10.1073/pnas.0911102106

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